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1.  Introduction 
 
Could rape ever be harmless? And even admitting that a rape could be 
harmlessly performed, how could the criminalization of such a harmless 
rape be justified if one endorses the harm principle as an absolute 
constraint on the moral legitimacy of criminal norms? 
In an article first published about ten years ago1, John Gardner and 
Stephen Shute (hereafter G&S) have articulated an affirmative answer to 
these questions: in their view, while it is possible that under certain 
circumstances the performance of a rape does not directly harm its victim 
(nor anyone else), criminalizing such harmless instances of rape would 
nonetheless meet the requirements of the harm principle2. 
 
 
∗  I would like to thank Professors Douglas Husak and Lucia Zedner, and Dr. Giorgio 
Maniaci, for their helpful comments on a previous version of this article. The usual 
disclaimer obviously applies. 
1  “The Wrongness of Rape”, originally in J. HORDER (ed.), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, 4th series, Oxford: OUP, 2000, pp. 193-217, and now re-printed in 
Gardner, Offences and Defences. Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford: 
OUP, 2007, pp. 1-32, wherefrom I shall quote henceforth. 
2 In “Beyond the Harm Principle” (in “Philosophy & Public Affairs”, 34 (3), 2006, pp. 215-
245), Arthur Ripstein confronts the same question: could the harm principle justify the 
criminalization of harmless wrongs «that most liberals would agree merit prohibition despite 
their harmlessness»? (p. 218) He imagines the case of a “harmless trespass”: 
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In this paper I will argue that, while G&S’s insights into the wrongness of 
rape strike one as reasonable (however, this is a point which I will not dwell 
on here), and while their general conclusion, that (what they take to be) a 
harmless rape should be criminalized, is to be agreed with, their argument in 
support of this conclusion ultimately fails, both for conceptual and normative 
reasons. On a conceptual level, their attempt to include the criminalization of 
“harmless” rape under the flag of the harm principle, adequately scrutinized, 
proves to be logically impossible due to the (over-demanding) features of their 
concept of “harmless” rape. On a normative level, their general account of the 
harm principle seems to be no less problematic, as it is more concerned with 
the social consequences indirectly stemming from the act to be criminalized 
than with the harm directly caused (or threatened) by it. 
That G&S fail in their attempt, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the criminalization of “harmless” rape cannot meet the 
standards of the harm principle anyhow. In order to see how this can 
be possible, we have to provide a better description of the paradigm 
case of so-called “harmless” rape and to refine our very understanding 
of the notion of “harm” in the harm principle. Then we will easily see 
that, insofar as we cling to the inner logic of the harm principle, rape 
can never be “harmless”, so that even cases of alleged “harmless” rape 
can straightforwardly be criminalized under the flags of that principle. 
 
2.  Gardner and Shute on Harmless Rape and the Harm Principle 
 
The idea of a “harmless rape” may, at first glance, seem a moral 
aberration: how could such a hideous and outrageous and disrespectful 
 
 
Suppose that, as you are reading this in your office or in the library, I let myself 
into your home, using burglary tools that do no damage to your locks, and take a 
nap in your bed. I make sure everything is clean. I bring hypoallergenic and lint-
free pajamas and a hairnet. I put my own sheets and pillowcase down over yours. 
I do not weigh very much, so the wear and tear on your mattress is nonexistent. 
By any ordinary understanding of harm, I do you no harm. 
 
In contrast to G&S, Ripstein thinks that «the harm principle fails to account for» such 
«a significant class of wrongs» as “harmless” trespass, and that the harm principle 
should be superseded by (what he dubs) “the sovereignty principle”, according to 
which «the only legitimate restrictions on conduct are those that secure the mutual 
independence of free persons from each other» (pp. 229 ff.). 
As I will try to show later, Ripstein is right in arguing for the inadequacy of a 
“narrow construction” of the harm principle to arrange such cases of so-called 
“harmless wrongs”; but, in my view, he is wrong in believing that the “narrow” one 
is the only plausible account of the harm principle. 
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action be considered “harmless”? Isn’t rape an evident malum in se? And 
doesn’t it follow from this that, in a way, rape is a structurally (and thus 
necessarily) harmful action? 
The conceivability, or inconceivability, of harmless rape, however, 
obviously depends on many variables: what is rape? What is the concept 
of harm on which one relies when wondering whether a rape can be 
harmlessly performed? What is the kind of harm(s) one assumes to be 
connected with (harmful) rape? 
In G&S’s conception, for instance, – where «[r]ape, understood in 
the modern way,» is defined as «non-consensual sexual relationship»3, 
and “harm” is defined as «the diminution of someone’s prospects, the 
change for the worse in his or her life4» – the conceivability of 
harmless rapes easily follows: it is evident, indeed, that there might be 
cases in which a non-consensual sexual intercourse is so performed 
that it does not change the victim’s (nor anyone else’s) life for the 
worse, because she does not experience (nor does anyone else) those 
feelings of violation, hurt, distress, that are usually associated with the 
fact of being raped.  
For example, 
 
A victim may be forever oblivious to the fact that she was raped, if, say, 
she was drugged or drunk to the point of unconsciousness when the rape 
was committed, and the rapist wore a condom. […] Then we have a 
victim of rape whose life is not changed for the worse, or at all, by the 
rape. […] She has no feelings about the incident, since she knows 
nothing of it. Indeed the story has no perspective dimension for the 
victim, except possibly a hangover in the morning; otherwise the 
victim’s life goes on exactly as before. Not even, for that matter, a 
prospective dimension for others, who might be put in fear of midnight 
rape by tales of soporific victims taken unawares. Remember: in our 
example the incident never comes to light at all. (Let’s add, for 
complete insulation, that the rapist, who told nothing of what he did, is 
run over by a bus as he leaves the house, and that this would have been 
no less likely to happen to him even if he had not perpetrated the rape, 
since that did not either delay or precipitate his leaving. So the rape 
makes no difference even to his prospects)5. 
 
 
3  G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 20. 
4  Ibidem, p. 4. See also RAZ, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in R. GAVISON 
(ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 327 ff. 
5  G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 5. 
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In such cases, G&S argue, rape is performed in its “purest” form, 
«entirely stripped of distracting epiphenomena»6 (such as: violence or 
threats, on the rapist’s side; and fear, pain, shame, on the victim’s side): 
all (or rather, the only morally relevant event) that happens here is, so to 
speak, neither more nor less than a rape7, that is, the performance of 
sexual intercourse without the victim’s consent.  
 
 
2.1. Is Pure Rape a Wrong to Its Victim? 
 
Given that, in G&S’s pure case of rape, no experiential harm is caused 
either to the victim or to others, a question arises: is it a wrong to its 
victim? Is pure rape, though experientially harmless, wrongful? 
The question might seem merely rhetorical, and easy to answer 
affirmatively. Its relevance, however, lies in the conceptual puzzle it 
represents to those who incline to think that the wrongness of rape is just a 
function of its experiential harmfulness8. If the consequences of this premise 
were coherently drawn, it should then be admitted indeed that pure rape, 
exactly because of its experiential harmlessness, is also lacking in wrongness. 
This conclusion, however, would come up against two serious problems. In 
the first place, it is clearly counter-intuitive to say that “pure rapists” do 
nothing wrong. Insofar as people have a right to sexual autonomy, or 
integrity9 – and insofar as this right entails the claim not to suffer unwanted 
sexual intercourse – pure rape is a violation of such a right, and it is very hard 
to see how any such violation might not amount to a wrong. 
Moreover, to link the wrongness of rape to experiential harm risks 
casting doubts on the very rationality of the feeling of violation in 
which the experiential harm itself largely consists: «to be rational,» 
the victim’s bad reactions to rape «must be epiphenomenal, in the 
sense that they cannot constitute, but must shadow, the basic, or 
essential, wrongness of rape»10. Otherwise (if there were nothing 
wrong in rape beside the victim’s experience), the victim’s bad 
 
 
6  Ibidem, p. 6. 
7  «It is rape pure and simple». Ibidem, p. 7. 
8  See, for instance, WERTHEIMER, Consent to Sexual Relations, Cambridge: CUP, 
2003. See also HUSAK, Gardner on the Philosophy of Criminal Law, in “Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies”, 29 (1), 2009, p. 184: «According to the experiential view, 
rape is wrongful because of the awful experience suffered by its victim. […] 
Although it encounters problems of its own, I have a good deal of sympathy for the 
experiential view.» 
9  See, e.g., LACEY, Unspeakable Subjects, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998, pp. 98-124. 
10  G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 7. 
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reactions should count as groundless and irrational, which would 
morally mean to add insult to injury11. 
Nor does Alan Wertheimer’s suggestion, that «[w]e can say that A’s 
behavior is wrong because it is likely to result in harm to B without having to 
insist that B was harmed in this case»12, help evade our puzzle. The pure case 
of rape is so construed that in fact – even at the very moment of its 
performance – it is unlikely to result in an experiential harm. The question to 
be answered is then exactly the one to which Wertheimer’s argument does not 
apply: how can we explain the wrongness of rape in cases where a rape does 
not result, nor is likely to result, in experiential harm? 
As G&S sensibly point out, to solve the puzzle we have to separate 
the wrongness of rape from its experiential harmfulness, which is to say 
that the first must not be conceived as a function of the second: if rape is 
wrong (and surely it is), it is not because of the experiential harms it 
normally causes13. It is quite the contrary: rape typically causes awful 
experiences because it is a wrong in the first place. And – brushing with 
very broad brush strokes – it is wrong exactly because it is “rape”, 
namely, non-consensual sexual intercourse, and thus a violation of the 
victim’s right to sexual autonomy14. 
 
 
2.2. The Criminalizability of Pure Rape Under the Harm Principle 
 
Once it is established that (pure) rape’s wrongness is conceptually 
independent of its possible experientially harmful consequences, a new 
question arises: should pure rape be criminalized? Probably, many of us 
 
 
11  Ibidem, p. 7: «The […] view, that [experiential] harms are what make rape 
wrong, turns the victim of a rape, in a way, into a victim twice over: for she is now, 
in her reactions to the rape, additionally a victim of irrationality, a pathological case. 
[…] the victim’s feeling of violation must be epiphenomenal to rape, or else there is 
nothing in rape to give her cause to feel violated.» 
12  Consent to Sexual Relations, Cambridge: CUP, p. 111. 
13  To say that experiential harms do not found the basic wrongness of rape 
obviously does not exclude the possibility that they can (and generally do) contribute 
to aggravating it: to make rape more wrong (a more serious wrong) than it would 
otherwise be. See G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 7. See also HUSAK, 
Gardner on the Philosophy of Criminal Law, p. 184. 
14  In a sense, rape is then conceptually wrong, insofar as it conceptually consists in 
the violation of a right (the right to sexual autonomy). This, in turn, easily fits with 
the widely shared idea that rape is a malum in se. Perhaps, it is this that G&S have in 
mind when they (somewhat obscurely) argue that «[p]robably, [rape] is among those 
wrongs which are never justifiable.» G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 1. 
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will intuitively think it should. But, how can we rationally and morally 
defend such an intuition? Why, in other words, should pure rape be 
criminalized? Admittedly, it is an immoral act. But, immorality per se is 
not a sufficient basis for criminalization. As is widely (even if not 
uncontroversially) admitted, the criminalization of an action, in order to 
be legitimate, should meet the standards of «some […] principle of 
toleration»15, or «liberty-limiting» or «coercion-legitimizing» principle16, 
the most credited (and debated)17 of which is the harm principle. 
Does the criminalization of pure rape meet the standards of the harm 
principle? At first sight, it clearly does not, inasmuch as the harm 
principle is interpreted as ruling out the criminalization of harmless 
actions and the experiential harmlessness of pure rape is taken to mean 
that it is harmless tout court. 
Here, however, we are aided by one of the more intriguing aspects of 
G&S’s analysis: a sophisticated account of the harm principle, under 
which, they argue, the criminalization of pure rape would be warranted 
«with flying colours». 
In the authors’ view, 
 
It is no objection under the harm principle that a harmless action was 
criminalized, nor even that an action with no tendency to cause harm was 
criminalized. It is enough to meet the demands of the harm principle that, 
if the action were not criminalized, that would be harmful18. 
 
Non-instrumental wrongs [such as pure rape], even when they are 
perfectly harmless in themselves, can pass [the] test [of the harm 
principle] if their criminalization diminishes the occurrence of them, and 
the wider occurrence of them would detract from people’s prospects19. 
 
 
15  GARDNER, Prohibiting Immoralities, in “Cardozo Law Review”, 28 (6), 2007, 
p. 2613. 
16  FEINBERG, Harm to Others, New York, Oxford: OUP, 1984, pp. 9 ff.; Harmless 
Wrongdoing, New York, Oxford: OUP, 1988, p. ix. 
17  For some critical accounts of the harm principle, see, among others: DRIPPS, The 
Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle, in “Criminal Justice Ethics”, 17 (2), 1998; 
HARCOURT, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, “Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology”, 90 (1), 1999; HOLTUG, The Harm Principle, in “Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice”, 5, 2002; RIPSTEIN, Beyond the Harm Principle; CANE, Taking Law Seriously: 
Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate, in “The Journal of Ethics”, 10, 2006; DUFF, 
Answering for Crime, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, Ch. 6. From a criminological 
perspective, see ZEDNER, Criminal Justice, Oxford: OUP, 2004, pp. 52-58. 
18  G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 29. 
19  Ibidem. See also GARDNER, Reply to Critics, in Offences and Defences, p. 242: «the 
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In other words, the criminalization of a harmless act-type (A) is only 
justified under the harm requirement insofar as: 
 
1. it is able to (it will probably) reduce the occurrence of A-act-tokens;  
 
and 
 
2. the reduced occurrence of A-act-tokens is, in its turn, able to (it will 
probably) reduce the occurrence of some kind of harm (B) either directly 
or indirectly related to A-act-tokens’ occurrence. 
 
As to our present question (that of the criminalizability of “harmless” 
rapes under the harm principle), in particular, G&S’s argument is that 
 
[i]f the act in this case were not criminalized, then, assuming at least 
partial efficacy on the part of the law, people’s rights to sexual autonomy 
would more often be violated. This would be a harm, not only to those 
people (if they were conscious and became aware of the rape), but also to 
a broader constituency of people (in our culture mainly women) whose 
lives would then be even more blighted than at present by violations of 
their right to sexual autonomy and, more pervasively still, by their 
justifiable fear of violations of their right to sexual autonomy. These 
blights are harms which the legal prohibition on rape, if it is functioning 
properly, helps to reduce. For the purposes of the harm principle that is all 
that is needed. There is no need to show, in addition, that a given rape 
caused, or was likely to cause, harm20. 
 
To sum up, in G&S’s view the criminalization of pure rape is warranted 
under the harm principle because, they assume, it would directly reduce 
(or would be likely to reduce) the total amount of pure rapes performed in 
a given society, and, indirectly (that is: via the primary reduction of pure 
rapes), it would reduce (or would be likely to reduce) the total amount of 
harms typically connected with the performance of (harmful) rapes 
(feelings of violation, hurt, fear, etc.), thus contributing to reducing the 
total amount of harm suffered by that very same society. 
 
 
harm principle does not require of each legal prohibition that it (proportionately) prohibits 
harmful wrongdoing. Rather, it requires of each legal prohibition that it (proportionately) 
serves to prevent harm. The law may prevent harm by prohibiting a harmless wrong where 
the non-prohibition of such a harmless wrong would itself be harmful». 
20  G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, pp. 29-30. 
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3.  Assessing G&S’s Account 
 
G&S’s general argument is promising. Duly qualified, for instance, it 
might provide a sensible explanation of why the criminalization of some 
per se harmless (or not sufficiently harmful) actions is quite uncontro-
versial when their repeated or collective performance is likely to 
contribute to the occurrence of some relevant “accumulative harm”21: 
pouring a small but not negligible quantity of a polluting substance into a 
river might per se be harmless (i.e., not seriously polluting); nonetheless, 
the performance of many such actions, by the same person or by many 
different persons, will probably result, in the long run, in serious pollution 
of the river. Applied to such cases, the argument of G&S seems to work: 
criminalizing a harmless (or not sufficiently harmful) wrong might meet 
the standards of the harm principle, insofar as it constitutes a reasonable 
and proportionate means in order to prevent a harm which would probably 
be caused if the criminalized action would be repeatedly performed. 
But the case of pure rape is clearly different from that of accumulative 
harms. The harmlessness of a single act-token contributing to an 
accumulative harm is, so to speak, a simple matter of scale: every single 
act-token contributing to an accumulative harm is by itself harmful (every 
single act-token of pouring a non-negligible amount of a polluting substance 
into a river is an, although minimal, act of pollution); its harmfulness, 
however, is not sufficiently “weighty” as to make it a relevant harm: the 
harmfulness of any such actions becomes relevant only “in perspective”, 
“accumulatively”. Numbers make a difference here: while an act-token may 
be per se harmless (or rather, not sufficiently harmful), many act-tokens (the 
repetition over time of that very same act-token, either by the same or by 
different persons) will become (sufficiently) harmful; the single act-token, 
though per se harmless (or not sufficiently harmful), directly contributes to 
the causation of the accumulative harm. 
By contrast, the experiential harmlessness of pure rape is not a matter 
of scale; it is, rather, a matter of conceptual necessity, pure rape being 
completely void of experiential harm; and, in the logic of G&S’s 
argument, this is necessarily so, given that, if pure rape was not 
experientially harmless, it would not be pure. Numbers do not make any 
 
 
21  On “accumulative harms” see, e.g., FEINBERG, Harm to Others, pp. 225 ff.; v. 
HIRSCH, Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation, in A.P. 
SIMESTER, A.T.H. SMITH (eds.), Harm and Culpability, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 
p. 265 (“accumulative harms” as a species of “remote harms”); WALLERSTEIN, 
Criminalizing Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic Activity, in “Cardozo 
Law Review”, 28 (6), 2007, pp. 2697 ff. 
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difference here: because of its being per se experientially harmless, the 
perpetration of pure rape cannot directly contribute to any variation in the 
overall amount of experiential harm suffered by society. The performance 
of 1000 pure rapes, being – metaphorically – the sum of 1000 zeroes, 
cannot have any different direct impact on the experiential harm suffered 
by society than the performance of a single pure rape would have22. 
This is not, of course, a decisive and definitive rejection of G&S’s 
argument. The authors might agree with the above distinction between 
pure rape and “accumulative” harms, though arguing at the same time that 
their account of the harm principle applies to pure rape as well. They 
might insist, for instance, that the harm principle does not necessarily 
require that the harm sought to be prevented be a large-scale projection of 
an (insufficiently weighty) harm already existing in nuce in every single 
token of the criminalized act-type. The criminalization of pure rape would 
then be justified by the fact (that G&S assume to be true) that it indirectly 
contributes to preventing a wider occurrence of the harms typically 
deriving from (harmful) rapes: although the harm of harmful rapes is not 
already embodied in pure rapes, the criminalization of the latter would 
nevertheless be warranted insofar as 
 
1. its non-criminalization is likely to result in an increase in the 
occurrence of pure rapes; 
2. and, in its turn, an increasing amount of pure rapes is likely to result in 
an increasing amount of the typical harms of rape. 
 
Unfortunately, in spite of G&S’s optimism on this point, their case of 
pure rape could hardly pass their two-prong harm test. One might notice, 
first of all, that the authors do not support their assumption with a 
sufficient empirical basis: on which data do they rely for arguing that the 
criminalization of pure rape will «probably» reduce the occurrence of 
pure rapes, and that the reduction of pure rapes will «probably» result in a 
reduction in the occurrence of the typical harms of rapes?23 
 
 
22 See also RIPSTEIN, Beyond the Harm Principle, p. 223 (comparing pollution with its 
case of “harmless” trespass): 
 
releasing toxins into the environment is harmful in the aggregate, and setting limits on 
particular instances prevents that harm. This model does no better with harmless 
trespasses. My nap is not one of many small contributing causes that combine to produce 
a serious harm. It is just as objectionable (or innocent) if one person does it as if many do. 
 
23  See HUSAK (Gardner on the Philosophy of Criminal Law, p. 186) for this, indeed 
sensible, objection. 
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Its empirical groundlessness, however, is only a secondary and 
derivative flaw of their argument. As I will try to show shortly, if G&S do 
not provide their reasoning with empirical support, it is because they 
cannot do it: the conceptual features of their pure case of rape, defined as 
a rape that «never comes to light», make it logically impossible for 
criminalization of such a wrong to contribute to a reduction in both the 
amount of pure rapes performed in, and the amount of the typical harms 
of (harmful) rape suffered by, a given society on the whole. 
The next two sections will be particularly devoted to highlighting 
these conceptual flaws in G&S’s reasoning. 
 
 
3.1. Harm Principle and General Prevention 
 
In order to pass G&S’s harm requirement’s test, as we have seen, 
criminalization of pure rape must, in the first place, be likely to reduce the 
occurrence of pure rapes. In other words, it should be the case that, «[i]f the 
act in this case were not criminalized, then, assuming at least partial efficacy 
on the part of the law, people’s rights to sexual autonomy would more often 
be violated»24 because of a more frequent performance of harmless rapes. 
This passage usefully underlines the close connection between the 
harm principle and the idea that criminal law has a general preventive 
efficacy: if we assume (as the harm principle does) that the very existence 
of criminal law is firstly justified as a means to prevent certain types of 
harms, the criminalization of an action, in order to be legitimate, must 
have a chance to reduce the amount of harm which, by it, is sought to be 
averted, which is to say that it must be capable of influencing the 
behaviour of its addressees, and thus of producing general preventive 
effects. This implies that a first (minimal) condition of legitimacy of a 
criminal norm is the existence of some logical space for its enactment to 
influence the actions of its addressees (let me assume: the citizens) so as 
to convince them not to undertake the criminalized action25. 
 
 
24  G&S in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, pp. 29-30. 
25  A second condition on which the general preventive hypothesis is grounded is an 
empirical generalization, according to which it is empirically true, or at least 
empirically demonstrable, that the enactment of a norm criminalizing an action will 
influence the general constituency of the citizens (or, at least, part of it) so as to make 
them refrain (because of fear or respect) from performing the criminalized action. That 
criminal law (or the enactment of a criminal norm) have in fact such an empirically 
demonstrable general preventive effect, however, is one of the most debated 
assumptions among criminal theorists and criminologists: many argue that the general 
preventive effect of criminal law is an indemonstrable and non-measurable myth. On 
 
Alessandro Spena 507
This action-influencing efficacy – which, notoriously, might take two 
main forms26, namely, deterrence (or negative prevention)27 and positive 
prevention28 – depends on the connection between crimes and 
 
 
this problem, see, among others, PAGLIARO, Empirical Verification of the Effects of 
General Prevention and Incapacitation, in “European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, 
and Criminal Justice”, 11 (4), 2003, pp. 398-412; ZEDNER, Criminal Justice, p. 92; 
ROBINSON, DARLEY, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 
in “Oxford Journal of Legal Studies”, 24 (2), 2004. 
26  e.g., ANDENAES, General Prevention – Illusion or Reality?, in “Journal of Criminal 
Law, Criminology & Police Science”, 43, 1952, pp. 179 ff.; PAGLIARO, Empirical 
Verification, pp. 398 ff.; MILITELLO, La prevenzione dei reati, in FERRACUTI (ed.), 
Trattato di criminologia, medicina criminologica e psichiatria forense, vol. V, Milano: 
Giuffrè, 1987, pp. 181 ff.; GARDNER, The Functions and Justifications of Criminal Law 
and Punishment (1998), in N. JAREBORG, A. VON HIRSCH, B. SCHÜNEMANN (eds.), 
Positive Generalprävention als letzte Auskunft oder letzte Verlegenheit der Straftheorie, 
Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag, reprinted in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, pp. 201 ff. 
27  In which case the preventive effect is deemed to result: either from the fear of the 
punishment whose infliction the relevant criminal norm threatens (in Feuerbach’s 
terminology, deterrence as psychological coercion – psychologischer Zwang – against 
citizens); or from a rational calculation of the costs (i.e., the risk of being punished) and 
opportunities of committing a crime. 
On deterrence see, e.g., BECCARIA, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764), Turin: Einaudi, 1965, 
§ XLI; Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1823), 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907; FEUERBACH, Anti-Hobbes, Erfurt: Hennings, 1798, Ch. 
7; Revision der Grundsätze und Grundbegriffe des positiven Peinlichen Rechts (1799), 
vol. I, anastatic reprint, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1966, pp. 39-60; Lehrbuch des 
Gemeinen in Deutschland Gültigen Peinlichen Rechts (1847), anastatic reprint of the 
14th edition, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1973, pp. 36 ff.; ANDENAES, Does Punishment 
Deter?, in “Criminal Law Quarterly”, 11, 1968, pp. 76-93. 
28  In which case the preventive effect is deemed to stem from «the seal of 
authoritative moral judgement» [Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing, p. 13] that we 
(allegedly) attach to criminal norms, and from the respect that these norms (allegedly) 
instill (or should instill) into us all. With regard to this, Joannes Andenaes talks of a 
«moral or socio-pedagogical influence of punishment» (The General Preventive Effects 
of Punishment, in “University of Pennsylvania Law Review”, 114 (7), 1966, p. 950), 
which is grounded on the fact that «[p]unishment is not only the artificial creation of a 
risk of unpleasant consequences, it is a means of expressing social disapproval». See 
Does Punishment Deter?, p. 81. 
It is of positive general prevention that Neil MACCORMICK (Legal Right and Social 
Democracy. Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, 
p. 34) is essentially talking when he sensibly argues that 
 
[t]here is a powerful and plausible case for supposing that, precisely because of its 
symbolic force as the public morality of the state, the criminal law with its public 
drama and symbolism of trials and punishments can be to some extent constitutive 
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punishments, that is, on the possibility of being punished for having 
committed a crime. This is obviously the case as for deterrence, given that 
it derives from fear of punishment, or at least from a rational calculation 
of the costs (the risk of punishment) that an agent is disposed to pay in 
order to gain its benefit (the commission of a crime). But positive general 
prevention, resting on the moral authority which is (deemed to be) 
expressed by the threat of (legal) punishment, also requires the possibility 
of being punished: it is only the view of punishment, embodying a 
message of «public reprobation and moral censure»29, that gives criminal 
norms their (alleged) mark of moral authority; it is, thus, the possibility of 
a punishment that people should take as a particularly telling index of the 
fact that a certain norm, and the value or interest it aims to protect, are, 
from the law’s perspective, worthy of particular respect. 
The relevant question is, then, whether the criminalization of pure 
rape could have general preventive effects. G&S clearly assume it could 
(although they do not specify whether they refer to negative or positive 
general prevention); but, I am afraid that, by defining pure rape as rape 
that ‘never comes to light’, they introduce a sort of a Trojan horse in their 
general argument: inasmuch as pure rape is so defined, its criminalization 
cannot result in any reduction of the overall amount of pure rapes 
performed in a given society.  
Indeed, if the very concept of pure rape entails its never being discovered by 
anyone, it also entails pure rapes as such never being punished. A penal law 
criminalizing them would then be a law whose content logically entailed the 
impossibility of enforcing it: an unenforceable law criminalizing a thus non-
punishable crime. But, as we have seen, the enforcement, and the enforceability, 
of a threat of punishment are of vital importance to its general preventive 
efficacy30. A non-enforceable criminal norm could hardly claim any kind of 
deterrent effects: no fear might be instilled (in rational beings) by punishment 
that self-evidently cannot be enforced; on the other hand, the “benefits” of 
committing the crime would find no offset in the (in fact, nonexistent) risk of 
punishment. Moreover, a non-enforceable criminal norm could not even have 
any positive general preventive efficacy: first of all, as I have argued before, 
 
 
of a common morality for the body of citizens as such. The criminal law does not 
always and necessarily reflect a moral consensus; but it tends to generate one. 
 
29  J. FEINBERG, Harmless Wrongdoing, p. 12. See also ID., The Expressive Function 
of Punishment, in “The Monist”, 49 (3), 1965, pp. 397-423; A. VON HIRSCH, Censure 
and Sanctions, Oxford: OUP, 1993; R.A. DUFF, Punishment, Communication, and 
Community, Oxford: OUP, 2001; J. TASIOULAS, Punishment and Repentance, in 
“Philosophy”, 81, 2006, pp. 283 ff. 
30  A. VON FEUERBACH, Anti-Hobbes, Ch. 7. 
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positive general prevention, as well as deterrence, depends on the link between 
crime and punishment, so that no positive preventive force could be claimed by 
a self-evidently unenforceable criminal norm; secondly, it would be completely 
pointless to attribute a positive general preventive efficacy to the criminalization 
of actions which straightforwardly constitute (as happens, in our cultures, even 
for pure rape) mala in se: if the job of a criminal norm is to convince the citizens 
that a certain conduct is seriously wrongful, it should be concerned with a 
conduct per se not obviously so; otherwise, the norm would be completely 
useless and redundant. In other words, as to mala in se (for instance, as to those 
actions – such as homicide, rape, etc. – whose wrongness might be classified 
among the principles of a Hartian “minimum content of natural law”) there is no 
logical space for positive general prevention, given that people’s awareness of 
their wrongness hardly needs criminalization, a formal law declaration31. In such 
cases, criminal law’s general preventive efficacy, if any, can only take the form 
of deterrence. 
It is, thus, logically impossible for G&S’s pure rape incrimination to 
have any kind of general preventive efficacy, and thus to pass the first 
step of (G&S’s) harm requirement test: criminalization of pure rape 
cannot have the general preventive effect of reducing the overall amount 
of pure rapes occurring in a given society. 
 
 
3.2. The “Non-Discovery Requirement” 
 
If my arguments hit the mark, G&S fail to show that a criminalization of 
pure rape, as they conceive it, would be warranted under the harm principle, 
as they conceive it. Insofar as the relevant definition of pure rape contains a 
“non-discovery requirement”, there will be no point in criminalizing it, and 
its criminalization will then be – qua pointless – unjustified. In fact, I know 
of no jurisdiction that defines (any types of) rape by making use of a non-
discovery clause. G&S seem to argue for the contrary when they say that in 
some jurisdiction «[e]ven the pure case is classified as rape, and criminally 
so»32; but, they arguably refer to cases in which the pure case of rape is 
criminalized regardless of whether it comes to light33. 
 
 
31  John Gardner seemingly argues for the contrary when he writes that the increasing 
occurrence of harmful rapes, as consequence of non-criminalization of pure rape, would 
be due to the fact that «it [i.e., the non-criminalization of pure rape] would license men 
to regard women as less sexually autonomous, and hence encourage their use as sex 
objects» [Reply to Critics, p. 242]. 
32  G&S in J. GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 29. 
33  Think, for instance, of the Clause 1 of the UK Sexual Offences Bill 2003: “A person 
(A) commits an offence [of rape] if (a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or 
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Why then do they think that the “pureness” of rape requires that it 
never come to light? As far as I can see, the rationale of such a non-
discovery requirement lies in the authors’ intent to make it clear that a 
rape may be wrongful even when it is experientially harmless34. But, do 
they really need such a demanding requirement in order to reach that 
conclusion? No doubt, in the case of a rape that never comes to light the 
conceptual separation between wrongness and experiential harmfulness of 
rape emerges in its clearest form: the evaluation of the act is made here 
completely disregarding its consequences. Such an appreciable benefit 
comes, however, at a greater cost: that of rendering absurd, illogical, the 
very idea of criminalizing pure rape. 
In fact, there is no need to pay such a cost. Generally speaking, if we 
want to argue that the moral quality of an act does not depend on its 
consequences, we only need to disregard them and exclusively focus on 
the act’s intrinsic characteristics; and if we also want to separate the moral 
quality of the act from even the likelihood (the “risk”) that it result in 
certain consequences, we only need to construe our paradigm case in such 
a way that it is unlikely to result in those consequences. In sum, we only 
need to leave the consequences of the act, as well as the probability that it 
will result in them, out of our focus; we need not, instead, bring the actual 
non-occurrence of those consequences into focus, by committing 
ourselves to the hypothesis that the act will never result in them. 
By enriching their pure rape case with a non-discovery clause, thus, 
G&S do (much) more than is required in order to show that the wrongness 
of rape is not a function of its experiential harmfulness: it would have 
been sufficient to limit their description to those circumstances alone 
(«the victim […] was drugged or drunk to a point of unconsciousness 
when the rape was committed, and the rapist wore a condom»; «the rapist 
[…] told no one of what he did,» and he did not do anything anomalous 
after the fact) that make it sure that a rape is so performed that it is not 
directly experienced, and is unlikely to be ever experienced, by anyone. 
 
 
3.3. Is G&S’s Account of the Harm Principle Tenable? 
 
Let us return to the argument put forward by G&S in their article. Any logical 
obstacle to an application of their harm principle test to their paradigm case of 
 
 
mouth of another person (B) with his penis, (b) B does not consent to the penetration, 
and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.” 
34  «Acts which never come to light are not rendered innocent by that fact alone.» 
G&S in J. GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 6. 
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pure rape clearly vanishes, once this case is amended as suggested above: 
criminalization of pure rape seems now not to be nonsensical from a general-
preventive point of view, so that there would be logical space to criminalize it 
as a means to decrease (via general prevention) the overall amount of the 
typical harms of rape occurring in a given society35. 
A normative question, however, immediately arises: is theirs a tenable 
account of the harm principle? 
As we have seen, G&S’s is a two-stage account, according to which, 
for the criminalization of an action to meet the harm requirement’s 
standards, it is enough that the occurrence of a socially harmful condition 
be indirectly connected to the performance of the criminalized action: 
«[s]o far as the harm principle is concerned, […] an indirect connection to 
harm is all that is required to justify a (proportionate) legal inter-
vention»36; it would not be necessary that the criminalized action be per 
se harmful; it would be sufficient that, if the action were not criminalized, 
that (assuming that criminal law has a general preventive efficacy) would 
indirectly cause a harm to society. 
Although it seemingly works in some cases37, I don’t think this a 
plausible account of the harm principle. Its major problem lies, in my view, 
in the fact that it does not adequately distinguish between direct harm (the 
harm directly caused, or threatened, by the criminalized action) and social 
(or indirect) harm (the harm that society may indirectly suffer because of 
the performance of a given act), and, consequently, it does not give direct 
harm its due weight, as it treats it instead as a negligible aspect of the harm 
principle, perfectly substitutable by considerations of social harmfulness. A 
shift in the focus of the harm principle, from direct to social harm, risks 
depriving that principle of its peculiar constraining force38, and therefore 
«has the potential to expand the scope of the criminal law exponentially»39, 
instead of contributing to constraining it within reasonable limits. Many per 
 
 
35  Clearly, this does not eliminate the need for empirical assessment of such a 
preventive claim; but this is a point I will not dwell on here. 
36  GARDNER, Reply to Critics, p. 242. 
37  See supra, note 21 and accompanying text. The case of “accumulative harms, 
however, only “seemingly” fits G&S’s test (or rather: is only seemingly similar to 
G&S’s paradigm case of harmless wrong, that is pure rape), because, as we have seen, 
the harm sought to be prevented in such a case is in nuce already contained, and thus is 
one directly deriving (although per accumulationem) from, every single (per se 
insufficiently harmful) token of the criminalized act. 
38  As is powerfully shown by BERNARD E. HARCOURT, The Collapse of the Harm 
Principle, pp. 124 f., 139-181. 
39  HUSAK, Overcriminalization, Oxford, New York: OUP, 2008, p. 72, fn. 82. See 
also ID., Gardner on the Philosophy of Criminal Law, p. 187. 
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se harmless, and perfectly “normal”, actions might ultimately result in some 
“socially harmful condition”: to drive a car (an action that might result in a 
car accident), to omit to use tissues when sneezing (an action that might 
contribute to a flu epidemic), to omit to wear a condom when having sex (an 
action that might result in HIV spreading), and so on. 
G&S’s reply to this objection might be as follows: the harm principle 
is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for criminalization; to be 
legitimate, it is not enough that the criminalization of an action meets the 
harm requirement’s standards; it also has to meet other standards: first of 
all, (what we might call) a standard of “wrongness”. As to rape, for 
instance, Gardner notes that, even in the pure case, «the would-be rapist is 
a would-be wrongdoer. This already picks him out as a suitable person to 
be threatened with punishment (coerced)»40. 
This argument, however, while having some appeal as to the case of 
rape, seems instead incapable of supporting Gardner’s (and Shute’s) 
general point about the harm principle. First, it would not apply to cases 
of mala quia prohibita, where «it is the law’s recognition of the wrong 
that makes it into a wrong»41: in such cases there would not be any pre-
criminal wrongness to pick the (criminal) wrongdoer «out as a suitable 
person to be threatened with punishment.» 
Furthermore, Gardner’s argument from wrongness, associated with that 
from social (indirect) harmfulness, could hardly save the harm principle 
from collapsing into a pan-criminalizing legal moralism, given that 
potentially any type of moral evils (even perfectly “free-floating evils”)42 
might be interpreted as capable of resulting, in the long run, in some kind of 
socially undesirable consequences. One may ask, for instance, if Gardner is 
consistent with his own argument when he argues that the wrong of 
«interrupting or talking over other people in a conversation, cannot be 
criminalized consistently with the harm principle»43; contrary to what 
Gardner claims, it seems indeed that the criminalization of such a wrong 
would straightforwardly be allowed by his (and Shute’s) account of the 
 
 
40  GARDNER, Reply to Critics, p. 243. 
41  GARDNER, Reply to Critics, p. 239. This objection may possibly be overcome by 
distinguishing between “legal regulation” and “criminalization” so as to argue (as does 
Anthony Duff) that a malum quia prohibitum is «[c]onduct that was not wrongful prior 
to its legal regulation’ but becomes ‘wrongful as a breach of a justified [“pre-criminal”] 
regulation: wrongful in a way that in principle merits criminalization.» [DUFF, 
Answering for Crime, pp. 89 ff.] However, given that, as far as I know, G&S do not 
expressly accept Duff’s account, I will disregard this possibility here. 
42  That is, evils that are «detached from individual needs, interests, deserts, claims, 
and rights». See FEINBERG, Harmless Wrongdoing, pp. 17 ff. 
43  GARDNER, Reply to Critics, p. 241 (emphasis added). 
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harm principle: if interrupting and talking over other people in 
conversations spread widely in society to the point of becoming the usual 
way in which people related to each other, this would clearly amount to a 
socially harmful consequence. (Wouldn’t people’s prospects in life be 
worsened by the fact of being unable to speak politely with each other?)  
But many other examples may be marshaled to show how weak a 
constraint on criminal law would the harm principle be if interpreted 
according to G&S: for instance44, why not criminalize anyone who «uses 
all the money that he has won fairly in a lottery to buy racehorses and 
champagne and refuses to donate any of it to a desperately deserving 
charity», given that, if widely repeated, such wrongful action might result 
in the socially undesirable consequence of sentencing to death many 
deserving charities? And why not to criminalize «[a]n athlete [who] takes 
part in sports competition with the representatives of an oppressive or 
racist state», given that, if he is emulated by many others of his fellow-
colleagues, this might result in the socially undesirable consequence of 
compromising the international public image of their country? And why 
not criminalize «[a]n individual [who] joins or supports an organization 
which he knows has racist leanings, such as the National Front in the 
United Kingdom[…], and […] exercises his own vote in its favor», given 
that this might result in the socially undesirable consequence of politically 
empowering such a blameful organization? 
The conclusion, that these – and similar – actions «cannot be criminalized 
consistently with the harm principle»45, could hardly rely on G&S’s account. 
That conclusion may only be drawn if we give direct harm its due weight, and 
assume that, according to the harm principle, an action should not be 
criminalized unless it is directly harmful, that is, if it is not the case that its 
very performance directly causes, or risks causing, harm to others. 
 
 
4.  Attempting to Solve the Puzzle 
 
The puzzle of pure rape seems to remain untouched by our discussion so far. 
If pure rape is a per se harmless wrong, an account such as that of 
G&S (according to which the harm principle only requires that, if a given 
action were not criminalized, an indirect, social harm would then follow) 
 
 
44  The following three examples are taken from WALDRON, A Right to Do Wrong, in 
“Ethics”, 92 (1), 1981, p. 21. 
45  This conclusion is not at all compromised by the fact that there might also be other 
reasons not to criminalize those actions (for instance, the fact that in our examples the 
person who acts has a right to do it). 
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seems to be the only way to warrant its criminalization under the harm 
principle. But, if we maintain that G&S’s approach ultimately fails (and 
has to be superseded by one in which it is required instead that the action 
to be criminalized either directly causes or risks causing harm), any 
attempt to reconcile the criminalization of pure rape with the logic of the 
harm principle turns out to be impossible46. 
This is not a negligible obstacle to acceptance of the harm principle. I 
take it for granted that pure rape, being a hideous malum in se, should be 
criminalizable under every reasonable theory of criminalization. Hence, if 
the harm principle really was unable to accommodate its criminalization, 
serious doubts would then be cast on its eligibility as an absolute and 
insurmountable limit of criminal law. 
But, is it really so? Is pure rape really harmless? And can its 
criminalization really not be warranted under the harm principle? An 
analysis of the inner logic of that principle, of the distinctive moral 
reasoning underlying it, will help us understand that in fact the moral 
reasons why, according to it, harmless wrongs should not be criminalized 
do not apply in the case of pure rape: we will then realize that 
criminalization of pure rape perfectly fits the moral logic of the harm 
principle just because pure rape is harmful in the sense of that principle. 
 
 
4.1. Harms and Rights 
 
1.  As is well known, the “harm-to-others principle” represents, in its 
most famous version, John Stuart Mill’s attempt to solve the fundamental 
problem of «the limits [of] the authority of society over the individual»47: 
under what conditions is it legitimate for a society (‘as the protector of all 
its members’)48 to coercively forbid, to criminalize49, the performance of 
 
 
46  G&S advance two alternative solutions to this puzzle: «[O]ne could sideline [the 
pure case of rape] by saying that the harm principle is a rule of thumb, and tolerates 
some departures from its standard. One could also sideline the pure case by observing 
that the harm principle’s standard is met if the class of criminalized acts is a class of 
acts which tend to cause harm, and that is true of rape in spite of the possibility of the 
pure case.» [in GARDNER, Offences and Defences, p. 29] These are clearly “second-
best” (or “emergency-exit”) strategies: it makes sense to resort to them only insofar as 
one has definitively ruled out the possibility of the harm principle fully confronting 
puzzling cases such as that of pure rape. As will become clearer later in the text, I still 
have not abandoned all hope of that possibility. 
47  On Liberty, 4th ed., London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869, 
Ch. IV, and passim. 
48  On Liberty, Ch. IV, par. 7. It is society’s (alleged) role as the «protector of […] its 
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an action by an individual? Mill’s answer essentially appeals to an “it’s-
not-your-business argument”, based on a «distinction […] between the 
part of a person’s life which concerns only himself, and that which 
concerns others»50. In view of this argument, a society may not 
legitimately prohibit the performance of an act by a person inasmuch as 
that person may, with good reason, reply by saying: “that’s not your 
business: it is nobody else’s business but mine, whether or not I perform 
such an act”. In Mill’s words: 
 
the individual […] must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But 
if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely 
acts according to his own inclination and judgement in things which 
concern himself, […] he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry 
his opinions into practice at his own cost51. 
 
Notice that, when Mill talks of «what concerns them [i.e., the other 
members of society]» and of «things which concern [the individual] 
himself», he is not using these expressions descriptively, as statements of 
 
 
members» that seems to give it the moral standing required to legitimate its use of 
coercion on individuals through criminal law. 
This might give raise to an objection to the idea that the “harm principle” is properly 
accounted for in terms of an “harm to others principle”, so that it also necessarily entails 
the rejection of legal paternalism: if society is the protector of all its members (and if it is 
exactly because of this role that it has the moral standing required to legitimately use 
coercion on individuals), isn’t it also the protector of the actor when he/she acts against 
him/herself? And, if it is, doesn’t this give society the moral standing to coerce individuals 
not to harm themselves? (See HART, Law, Liberty, and Morality; Stanford, Calif.: SUP, 
1963, pp. 30-34. See also J. RAZ, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, pp. 326 
ff.) To this objection it might be tentatively replied that society is entitled to act as 
protector of its members only insofar as they need protection; which is not the case when 
one of those members, being a suitably rational agent able to adequately appreciate the 
adverse consequences of his/her actions, acts against himself alone. 
For further reflections on «the question of moral standing», see G. POSTEMA, 
Public Faces—Private Places: Liberalism and the Enforcement of Morality, in G. 
DWORKIN (ed.), Morality, Harm, and the Law, Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, 
81 ff.; Politics is About the Grievance. Feinberg on the Legal Enforcement of Morals, in 
“Legal Theory”, 11, 2005, 307 ff. 
49  Although Mill is not specifically concerned with criminalization, criminal law is the 
proper ambit of this article; to criminal law and criminalization I will therefore limit my 
reading of the harm principle. Similarly, for instance, MACCORMICK, Legal Right and 
Social Democracy, pp. 28-34; FEINBERG, Harm to Others. 
50  On Liberty, Ch. IV, par. 8. 
51  On Liberty, p. 260 (emphasis added). 
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fact; rather, he is speaking normatively, and thus morally: his point is 
whether any member of society (and thus society as a whole) should or 
should not be concerned with the performance of the relevant act by the 
actor; the issue, therefore, is not whether there are any (singular or plural) 
subjects52 who “are in fact interested in” the performance of the relevant 
act, but whether any (singular or plural) subject “has an interest – better 
still, a legitimate interest53 – in” it54, whether it is against the interests of 
some (singular or plural) subject other than the actor. 
If nobody but the individual himself has a legitimate interest in (if, so to 
speak, nobody else is legitimated to be concerned with) the performance of 
the act – if nobody else’s legitimate stake is called into question (i.e., 
adversely affected) by such an act being performed – if, in other words, it is 
nobody else’s but an actor’s exclusive business, so that there is nobody who 
needs protection against the actor, then society (as the protector of its 
members) and the criminal law (as the last means, the extrema ratio, to which 
society may resort to protect itself and its members) lack any moral 
entitlement (“jurisdiction”) to coercively forbid, and thus to criminalize, it: 
 
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the 
interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question 
whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering 
with it becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining 
any such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no 
persons besides himself55. 
 
According to the harm principle, the proper ambit of criminal law is 
therefore limited to issues involving some legitimate interests, and thus to 
actions that negatively affect any such interest. 
Notoriously, however, a great bulk of debate lies behind the concept of 
“legitimate interest”. Many of its opponents have contended (and some of 
 
 
52  On plural (public and collective) interests (and harms), see G. POSTEMA, Collective 
Evils, Harms, and the Law, in “Ethics”, 97, 1987, pp. 414-440; FEINBERG, Harmless 
Wrongdoing, pp. 33-37. 
53  See, e.g., N. MACCORMICK, Legal Right and Social Democracy, p. 29; ASHWORTH, 
Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed., Oxford: OUP, 2006, p. 30 (in the harm principle, 
«the concept of ‘interest’ [should be understood] as matters in which a person has a 
legitimate stake»). 
54  The distinction between “being interested in X” and “having an interest (in) X” has 
also been underscored by JOHN KLEINIG, Crime and the Concept of Harm, “American 
Philosophical Quarterly”, 15 (1), 1978, p. 28, whose interpretation, however, is slightly 
different from that on which I am relying here. 
55  On Liberty, p. 276. 
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its supporters have conceded) that the harm principle does not, by itself, tell 
us what a legitimate interest is, and that it thus does not help solve the 
substantive problem of which actions, being harmful, may rightfully be 
prohibited. This is partly true, but its truthfulness amounts more to a 
clarification than to an objection. That, in order to concretely work, the 
harm principle requires an underlying substantive moral theory establishing 
which interests are legitimate, is obviously true56. But, this is not a special 
feature of that principle: every criterion of criminalization (every “liberty-
limiting” principle)57 presupposes an underlying substantive moral theory, 
at least insofar as one assumes that the criminalization of an act requires a 
special moral justification58. 
This does not mean that the harm principle (as well as every other liberty-
limiting principle) is per se vacuous, unless and until it is filled with some 
substantive moral theory. Although it requires such an underlying theory, it 
has, nonetheless, a (moral) role of its own to play in the (moral) reasoning 
leading to the criminalization of an act. This role is not that of “nominally” 
indicating which interests are or not legitimate and which concrete actions 
should or should not be prohibited, but instead that of providing us with a 
format, a scheme of reasoning, into which a substantive moral argument 
should be translatable if it has to work as a legitimate ground for 
criminalization: the harm principle provides us, metaphorically, not with a 
detailed map, but with a compass supplying coordinates that will necessarily 
need more moral specifications in order to be concretely useful. 
The stringency of the harm principle only depends, therefore, on how 
reasonable and exacting is the format it provides. To call the harm principle 
vacuous, it should be the case that every possible moral content could be poured 
into such a format, that every possible “immorality” could count as harm59. But 
this is not the case. On the contrary, by combining an “it’s-not-your-business” 
reasoning with the idea that only legitimate interests are criminally protectable, 
the harm principle provides us with a particularly demanding criterion, which, 
although not directly enumerating which interests are protectable, helps us 
understand what an interest has to be in order to be criminally protectable under 
the harm principle: that an interest be “legitimate”, indeed, essentially means 
 
 
56  See, e.g., MACCORMICK, Legal Right and Social Democracy, pp. 28-34; RAZ, 
Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, p. 328; FORTI, Per una discussione sui 
limiti morali del diritto penale, tra visioni «liberali» e paternalismi giuridici, in Studi in 
onore di Giorgio Marinucci, Milan: Giuffrè, 2006, pp. 315 ff. 
57  For an exhaustive list of such principles, see FEINBERG, Harm to Others, pp. 26-27. 
58  FEINBERG, Harmless Wrongdoing, pp. 12-13. 
59  «[I]f we begin to count as ‘harmful’ every kind of wrongful conduct that we see 
good reason to criminalize, the Harm Principle will do little to constrain legal 
moralism» [DUFF, Answering for Crime, p. 130]. 
D&Q, n. 10/2010 518
that its owner is entitled to demand that it be respected by others, so that an it’s-
not-your-business argument does not apply. In order to count as legitimate, 
interests should thus be deemed sufficiently important as to warrant a 
corresponding claim against others. In other words, an interest can count as 
legitimate only insofar as it figures in the justification of a right. 
According to the harm principle, not every interest is then protectable 
by the criminal law, but only those that can be counted as legitimate 
because of their figuring in the justification of a right. “Harm” then, in the 
sense of the harm principle, is nothing more nor less than the 
infringement of a right (i.e., of the interest that figures in the justification 
of a right): an act should not be criminalized unless it amounts to such a 
right-infringement. Not every immorality is punishable by criminal law, 
but only those that entail the infringement of a right60. 
 
2.  By appealing to an it’s-not-your-business argument, and thus to the 
harm principle, the actor figuratively stands up and cries: “you have no 
right to demand that I refrain from performing this action; your being 
concerned with it does not amount to a claim of yours against me (nor, 
correlatively, to a duty of mine to you); your concern is not sufficiently 
important as to deserve protection in the form of a right, held by you 
against me, that I refrain from performing the act at issue”. 
Thus stated, the argument strikes me as both intuitive and definitive: 
nothing, I think, can be sensibly replied against it, insofar as one admits 
that the issue at stake (the performance of the relevant act) is exclusively 
“an actor’s business”: as far as I can see, the only way to overcome an 
it’s-not-your-business argument is by defeating it, that is, by showing that 
the performance of the relevant act is not in fact an actor’s exclusive 
business, that there are other persons which are rightly concerned with it, 
that there are people who rightly, with (moral or legal) good reason, 
 
 
60  A rights-based account of the harm principle, therefore, while being a moralized 
account, does not necessarily conflate the harm principle with legal moralism: not if we 
assume (as seems plausible) that rights-violations are only a sub-class of (and not the 
entire class of the) moral wrongs: if we admit that not every moral wrong consists in the 
violation of a right, and thus that not every moral wrong presupposes the infringement 
of a right, legal moralism would then differ from the harm principle inasmuch as it 
allows the criminalization of moral wrongs which do not consist in the infringement of a 
right. According to the harm principle, instead, not every immorality could, nor should, 
count as a legitimate ground for criminalization, but only those immoralities which, 
consisting in the violation of a right, first of all presuppose the infringement of a right. 
There are different ways in which actions may be immoral: of these ways, only those 
consisting in the violation of a right may constitute, according to the harm principle, 
appropriate candidates for criminalization. 
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contend that the “if and how” of the relevant act’s performance is of some 
importance to them. 
 
3.  An interpretation of the harm principle founded on the idea of 
protection of rights has a long and noble tradition. Mill himself sometimes 
puts the issue this way: 
 
every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the 
benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each 
should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This 
conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather 
certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit 
understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each 
person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the 
labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members 
from injury and molestation. […] The acts of an individual may be hurtful 
to others or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going 
the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may 
then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law61. 
 
But even before the first edition of Mill’s essay (1859), the idea that the 
criminal law’s proper ambit is the protection of rights, and that criminal 
norms may only be enacted insofar as it is necessary to protect rights, had 
been one of the most distinctive flags of so-called “Enlightenment 
reformers of criminal law”, on whose thought was largely based the 
massive trend of liberal reform of criminal law that took place throughout 
the European continent during the last decades of the eighteen century and 
the first half of the nineteenth62. Subsequently, that very same leading idea 
passed into the agenda of the liberal continental criminal law scholarship, 
headed, among others, by the German criminalist Paul Anselm von 
 
 
61  On Liberty, Ch. IV, par. 3 (emphasis added). Correctly, therefore, Jean Hampton aligns 
Mill among the supporters of a “rights-based liberalism”. See HAMPTON, Retribution and the 
Liberal State, in “Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues”, 5, 1994, pp. 135 f. 
62  See WÜRTENBERGER, Das System der Rechtsgüterordnung in der Deutschen 
Strafgesetzgebung seit 1532 (1933), Neudruck, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1973, pp. 209 
ff.; SCHMIDT, Einführung in die Geschichte der Deutschen Strafrechtspflege, 3. Aufl., 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965, pp. 212 ff.; OEHLER, Wurzel, Wandel und 
Wert der Strafrechtlichen Legalordnung, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1950, pp. 96 
ff.; AMELUNG, Rechtsgüterschutz und Schutz der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M.: 
Athenäum Verlag, 1972, pp. 15-28; CAVANNA, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa. Le 
fonti e il pensiero giuridico, vol. II, Milano: Giuffrè, 2005, pp. 71 ff. 
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Feuerbach63, and then – later in the nineteenth century – was expressed at 
its best by the Italian founder of the so-called Scuola classica di dirito 
penale, Francesco Carrara64 65. 
More recently, a rights-based account of the harm principle (and, more 
generally, of criminalization) has been developed66 by Joel Feinberg in his 
famous four-volume The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law67. 
Notoriously, Feinberg slightly but significantly changed his views on 
the matter in the course of writing his masterpiece. It would then be 
misleading to attribute to him a single, monolithic position on the concept 
of harm and on the harm principle as a moral limit of criminal law. As far 
as I can see, however, it would not be incorrect to say that throughout his 
 
 
63  FEUERBACH, Revision der Grundsätze und Grundbegriffe des positiven Peinlichen 
Rechts, pp. 65 («Der Staat kann nur Rechtsverletzungen, und zwar als solche bestrafen. 
Der Grund der strafenden Gewalt ist die Sicherung vollkommener Rechte»); Lehrbuch 
des Gemeinen in Deutschland Gültigen Peinlichen Rechts, §§ 21 («ein Verbrechen […], 
im weitesten Sinne, ist eine unter Strafgesetze enthaltene Beleidigung oder eine durch 
ein Strafgesetz bedrohte, dem Rechte eines Anderen widersprehende Handlung»), 23 
(«Da Erhaltung der Rechte überhaupt Zweck der Strafgesetze ist, so sind sowohl die 
Rechte der Unterthanen, als auch die dem Staate (als moralischer Person) 
zukommenden Rechte, Gegenstand ihrer schützenden Drohungen»). 
64  CARRARA, Programma del corso di diritto criminale. Del delitto, della pena 
(1871), reprint of the fourth edition, Bologna: il Mulino, 1993 [the first edition of 
Carrara’s masterpiece is contemporary with Mill’s On Liberty first edition: 1859], §§ 42 
(«Oggetto del delitto non può che essere un diritto al quale la legge abbia espressamente 
accordata la sua tutela col divieto e con la sanzione»), 150 («la essenza del delitto 
(intendendo sempre sotto questo vocabolo il delitto vero e proprio ben diverso dalle 
trasgressioni di polizia) sta nella violazione di un diritto protetto dalla legge penale»), 
and passim. See also CARMIGNANI, Elementi di diritto criminale, first Milanese edition, 
Milan: Francesco Sanvito Editore, 1865, pp. 45 ff. (Carmignani was Carrara’s master.) 
65  Just in passing, it is worth noting that, since the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
in the Euro-continental (German, Italian, Spanish) criminal law theory, the conception of 
“crime” as “infringement of a right” has been largely (I would say, completely) superseded 
by another conception, which is assumed to be alternative to the first, according to which 
“crime” consists in the infringement of a “legal good” (Rechtsgut, bene giuridico, bien 
juridico). See, among others, AMELUNG, Rechtsgüterschutz und Schutz der Gesellschaft, 
pp. 52 ff.; DUBBER, Theories of Crime and Punishment in German Criminal Law, in “The 
American Journal of Comparative Law”, 53, 2005, pp. 682-696. 
66  Although along lines of thought largely different from that followed by the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Euro-continental liberals, and only partly inspired by 
Mill’s doctrine. 
67  See particularly FEINBERG, Harm to Others, Ch. 3. On Feinberg’s “rights-based 
liberalism”, see, e.g., ALEXANDER, Harm, Offense, and Morality, in “Canadian Journal 
of Law & Jurisprudence”, 7 (2), 1994, p. 202; HAMPTON, Retribution and the Liberal 
State, pp. 136 ff.; POSTEMA, Politics is About Grievance. 
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work he constantly maintained that the concept of harm in the harm 
principle should be interpreted in (at least, partly) moralized terms, as “the 
overlap” of both a non-normative (setback to interest) and a normative 
(violation of rights) sense of the word, so that it should properly «apply 
only to setbacks that are also wrongs», that is, to setbacks that consist in 
the unjustifiable and inexcusable violation of a person’s rights68. 
Moreover, Feinberg also interprets the notion of “offense” in the so-called 
“offense principle”69 as based on the violation of a right: 
 
[l]ike the word “harm”, “offense” has both a general and a specifically 
normative sense, the former including in its reference any or all of a 
miscellany of disliked mental states (disgust, shame, hurt, anxiety, etc.), 
and the latter referring to those states only when caused by wrongful 
(right-violating) conduct of others. Only the latter sense – wrongful 
offense – is intended in the offense principle as we shall understand it70. 
 
It might then be argued that Feinberg’s theory of criminalization is 
characterized by its being grounded in what Gerald Postema has appropriately 
dubbed a «grievance morality»71, that is, a conception according to which 
criminal law should be properly concerned only with those «types of evil 
[that] are grounds of personal grievance»72, that are «inflicted upon individual 
persons»73, and that therefore constitute violations of a person’s rights74. 
The differences between Feinberg’s account, as so construed, and the 
interpretation of the spirit of the harm principle that I have put forward in this 
article can be summarized as follows. I think it responds to the inner logic of 
the harm principle that the “harm” be conceptually equated to (exhaustively 
 
 
68  FEINBERG, Harm to Others, pp. 105 ff. But see also, for example, FEINBERG, 
Harmless Wrongdoing, pp. x, xviii.  
69  Which is, in Feinberg’s standard approach, the other liberty-limiting principle that, 
along with the harm principle, exhausts the range of good grounds for criminalization. 
See FEINBERG, Offense to Others, New York, Oxford: OUP, 1985. 
70  FEINBERG, Offense to Others, pp. 1-2. 
71  POSTEMA, Politics is About Grievance, pp. 307 ff. 
72  FEINBERG, Harmless Wrongdoing, p. 17 and passim. 
73  Ibidem, p. 18. 
74  «Grievance evils, Feinberg argues, are wrongs done to specific persons. Grievance evils 
are of immediate personal concern to them; the evils directly affect their own good and 
interests, goods in which they have a direct and personal stake. These goods ground rights, 
and these rights imply duties on the part of others to respect and even promote the goods and 
interests that the rights are designed to protect». [POSTEMA, Politics is About Grievance, p. 
307.] «Part of what it is to have a genuine moral grievance, Feinberg seems to say, is that one 
can demand protection against violations of one’s rights.» Ibidem, p. 308. 
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defined in terms of) an “infringement of rights”: harm in the harm principle is 
precisely the infringement of a right. Feinberg, instead, disentangles the two 
notions, as is made clear, for instance, by the fact that he makes not only the 
notion of harm in the harm principle but also the notion of offense in the 
offense principle conditional upon the violation of a right. This inclines me to 
think that, in his view, the idea of a “right-violation”, instead of being part of 
the very notion of harm (or of that of offense), is a further qualification of 
those notions, only required to make them relevant, respectively, to the harm 
principle and the offense principle75. (An implication of the difference just 
mentioned is that, in the interpretation I have provided, there is no point in 
singling out an offense principle as distinct from the harm principle: insofar 
(but only insofar) as an “offense” is only relevant if it “infringes/violates a 
right”, its criminalization is already warranted by the harm principle)76. 
Another peculiar feature of Feinberg’s moralized approach is that he 
defines the “normative sense” of its notion(s) of harm (and offense) as the 
“unjustified and inexcusable violation of a person’s right.” This raises at 
least two kinds of objections – hopefully evaded instead by the 
interpretation of the harm principle I have suggested. First, it overlooks 
the basic distinction between offences77 and defences78. “Unjustifiability 
and inexcusability” are obvious conditions to make an actor punishable 
for having committed the actus reus of a crime with the appropriate mens 
rea, but they have nothing to do with the logic of the harm principle: they 
work on a different level than the harm principle; while the latter’s role is 
that of contributing to the definition, to the identification, to the singling 
out of the types of acts that – because of their being (or not being) 
seriously harmful – should (or should not) be made criminal, justifications 
and excuses instead, qua defences, are essentially predicaments of act-
tokens, not of act-types: they say nothing on the kind of harm embodied in 
a certain type of act; rather, if available, they serve to shield criminal 
responsibility from a concrete defendant who has concretely committed 
 
 
75  To be sure, in Harm to Others Feinberg argues that “wrong” (as “violation of a 
right”) is one of the possible senses (the normative one) of “harm”. See Feinberg, Harm 
to Others, pp. 109 ff. Subsequently, however, he abandoned this terminology. See 
Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing. 
76  For a hint at this, Donini), “Danno” e “offesa” nella c.d. tutela penale dei 
sentimenti, in “Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, 2008, p. 1575. 
77  Here I am using “offence”, and “defence”, (with “c”) for convenience only, as a way to 
distinguish the word in its present use (as the definition of the actus reus and mens rea of a 
crime) from its Feinbergian use in the context of the “offense [with “s”] principle.” 
78  On this distinction, see, e.g., FLETCHER, Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1978, pp. 552 ff.; HUSAK, Philosophy of Criminal Law, Totowa, NJ: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1987, pp. 187 ff.; GARDNER, Offences and Defences. 
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an act that is an instance of the act-type described in a criminal norm. By 
grounding the normative aspect of the concept of harm in the harm 
principle on the “unjustifiability and inexcusability” of the potentially 
criminalized conduct, Feinberg thus «confuses eligibility of action-types 
for criminal prohibition with certain defenses that might be available to 
defendants (namely, certain excuses or positive justifications)»79. 
Related to this, another problem arises. If the “unjustifiability” (and 
thus, the injustice) of the “harm” is not relevant to the harm principle, it is 
then inappropriate to define the normative sense of harm by resorting to the 
notion of “right-violation”, provided that the violation of a right is exactly 
an unjust infringement of a right80. Hence, by talking of the violation (and 
not of the infringement) of a right as part of his moralized concept of harm, 
Feinberg, once again, impliedly conflates an aspect properly regarding the 
harm principle (namely, the infringement of a right) with other aspects 
regarding instead the (un)availability of certain kinds of defences to the 
concrete actor as a condition of his/her criminal responsibility. 
 
 
4.2. A Sketchy Conclusion 
 
To sum up, as I have interpreted it in this paper, the harm principle is a 
criterion of criminalization according to which an act may legitimately be 
 
 
79  POSTEMA, Politics is About Grievance, p. 298. 
Slightly different is the point expressed in Anthony Duff’s critique [see Harms and 
Wrongs, in “Buffalo Criminal Law Review”, 5 (1), 2001, pp. 18-19]: in his view, 
Feinberg should have paid  
 
more attention to the distinction between questions of “wrongdoing” and 
“attribution”: between questions about what kinds of conduct should be defined as 
criminal and questions about the conditions under which such criminal conduct 
should be attributed to a defendant who can be held responsible and liable for it[…] 
For questions of excuse are typically questions of attribution, rather than of 
wrongdoing: what is at stake is not whether a wrong was done (of a kind that 
concerns the criminal law), but whether the wrong can be attributed to this agent as 
something for which he can be held criminally liable. To build inexcusability into 
the criteria of criminalization, as Feinberg does, thus conflates distinct questions. 
 
80  Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights (1977), in EAD., Rights, Restitution, & 
Risk, edited by W. Parent, Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard UP, 1986, 51 ff. The 
distinction between infringement and violation of a right is explicitly accepted by 
Feinberg himself. See, for instance, FEINBERG, Voluntary Euthanasia and the 
Inalienable Right to Life, in “The Tanner Lecture on Human Values”, Delivered at The 
University of Michigan (April 1, 1977) and Stanford University (April 11, 1977). 
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criminalized only insofar as it amounts at least81 to the infringement of a 
right. This is an admittedly moralized interpretation. Arguably, if that 
principle has to work as a moral constraint on criminalization (if it has to 
show why it would be morally illegitimate to criminalize harmless 
conduct), it has to have some kind of moral strength, or appeal. To make 
sense of the harm principle as a moral limit of the criminal law (as a 
means «to pick out the kinds of wrong that properly concern the criminal 
law», «[w]e […] cannot appeal to a non-moralised or pre-moral notion of 
harm»82: that notion should be, to some extent, morally informative; 
otherwise, the harm principle could not «explain the distinctive status that 
it assigns to harm: why harm matters, when harm matters, or why harm, in 
particular, would be especially relevant to the criminal law»83. 
The interpretation for which I have argued here – that the concept of 
harm in the harm principle is to be equated to that of a right’s 
infringement – suitably meets (or, at least, tries to meet) these warnings. 
Now we are in a position to attempt a sketchy solution of our initial 
puzzle: how can the criminalization of pure rape be warranted under the 
harm principle? My answer should now be clear: although experientially 
harmless, pure rape is not harmless tout court. Exactly because it is the 
violation of the victim’s right to sexual autonomy, it always necessarily 
entails (a maius ad minus) a victim’s right also being infringed, and thus – 
harm being the infringement of a right – it always entails harm to its 
victim. For the sake of the harm principle, that is sufficient. 
 
 
81  Following the original Mill’s position, I have been appealing here to a negative 
conception of the harm principle, in which it is properly conceived as a (tendentially 
insurmountable) limit to, and not simply as a possible good ground for, criminalization: 
according to such an account, the harmfulness of a conduct is a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition of every legitimate criminalization. 
The harm principle might also be positively interpreted, as a good (but not necessarily 
exclusive) reason in support of criminalization. This is, for instance, Feinberg’s account: 
«The harm principle: It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it 
would probably be effective in preventing […] harm to persons other that the actor […]» 
[Harm to Others, p. 26]. As we have seen, Feinberg admits of the moral legitimacy of at 
least another liberty-limiting principle, the “offense principle” [ID., Offense to Others]. 
Feinberg’s position is substantially shared, among others, by SIMESTER, VON HIRSCH, 
Rethinking the Offence Principle, in “Legal Theory”, 8 (3), 2002, pp. 269-295; SIMESTER, 
SULLIVAN, Criminal Law. Theory and Doctrine, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2007, pp. 581 ff. But see also HART, Law, Liberty, and Morality. 
On the distinction between “positive” and “exclusive” accounts of the harm 
principle, see RIPSTEIN, Beyond the Harm Principle, p. 216; DUFF, Answering for 
Crime, pp. 123 f. 
82  DUFF, Answering for Crime, p. 128. 
83  RIPSTEIN, Beyond the Harm Principle, p. 216 (footnotes omitted). 
